BIS Extends Chip Controls to Remote Access and Tightens License Requirements

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The Commerce Department has used existing end-use authorities to reach remote access to advanced computing power, signaled that some past transactions already required a license, and established new controls for countries of diversion concern.

Key Takeaways

  • Effective now: The interim final rule took effect on November 19, 2026, with no delayed compliance date; comments are due January 19, 2027.
  • Data center control (new § 744.24): A license is required to supply advanced chips and servers to any data center that provides more than 12 million aggregate TPP to or for D:5/Macau-headquartered companies; existing providers have 90 days to obtain one.
  • Look-back under § 744.23: BIS states that the existing headquarters-based control has always reached transactions where covered companies are the primary remote users of a data center, and that violators “should submit a voluntary self-disclosure.”
  • Five new destinations: Advanced chips now require a license to or within Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil, unless the recipient is headquartered (or ultimately parented) in the United States and the exporter files monthly reports.
  • Foundry presumption: For designers tied to D:1, D:4, D:5, or the five new destinations, foundries and OSATs can no longer rely on transistor-count attestations and need a license unless the designer is approved or authorized.

Background and Context

The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) formally published the interim final rule Addressing Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors on November 19, 2026.1 This Rule formally rescinds the January 2025 AI Diffusion Rule, which BIS did not enforce and announced in May 2025 it would rescind (see our May 2025 Legal Update).

BIS’s announcement states that the Rule was “written by and at the direction of” the Treasury Department and the National Security Council, an unusual attribution for an EAR amendment.1 The Rule follows the June 2026 is-informed letter to Anthropic treating API access to AI models as a controlled release (see our June 2026 Legal Update) and was announced days before President Donald Trump’s November 19 meeting with President Xi Jinping, amid a push to attach chip export bills to the FY2027 National Defense Authorization Act.

What the Rule Does

1. Data center end-use control (§ 744.24)

New § 744.24 requires a license to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) advanced chips and servers (ECCNs 3A090 (other than the less advanced 3A090.c), 4A090, and related items) where there is “knowledge” that they are destined to a data center “to or within any destination worldwide” that provides or will provide more than 12 million “aggregate TPP,” at one data center or through “linked data centers,” to or for D:5/Macau-headquartered companies.

  • Intermediaries: “for” covers a non-D:5/Macau customer that trains models for, participates in training for, or provides models to a D:5/Macau company.
  • Linked data centers: Defined to include digitally linked facilities that “share resources, balance workloads, and replicate data as a unified whole.”
  • Diligence: A foreign data center’s failure to provide customer diligence, including on direct or indirect ownership or control by D:5/Macau persons, “shall be considered a red flag that presumptively provides you with ‘knowledge’” unless resolved. BIS says this diligence should prevent circumvention “through corporate restructurings or spinoffs.”
  • Downstream reach: The control applies whether or not the person in possession was party to the original export, and a later change to a prohibited end use, including taking on a covered customer, is a transfer (in-country) requiring authorization.
  • Notice: Unlicensed shipments made on or after November 19 must come with notice that the transferor needs BIS authorization for any prohibited use and must follow BIS’s KYC guidance.
  • Exclusions and licensing: Compute provided only for a “commercial recommender system” is excluded on submission of specified information; applications are reviewed case by case; no license exceptions apply; and BIS may impose further requirements by is-informed letter.
2. Bis's stated clarification of the existing § 744.23 control

BIS presents its reading of the existing “for an entity” control in § 744.23 as a clarification, stating that it “has never been limited only to” covered consignees or end users and extends to transactions “on behalf of” covered entities, e.g., where one is the purchaser or “the exclusive or primary (greater than 50 percent of total compute) remote end user of the data center computing capacity.” BIS adds that “[a]ny entities in violation of this requirement should submit a voluntary self-disclosure.”

BIS points to its October 2023 rule, which described the control as preventing PRC-headquartered entities from “setting up cloud servers or data centers in other countries,” and to the regulatory example of a “PRC-headquartered cloud or data server provider.” Those materials address covered companies that own or operate the infrastructure, not sales to an unaffiliated data center whose primary remote customer is a D:5/Macau company. The 50 percent gloss first appears in this preamble, and BIS’s May 2026 guidance said nothing about remote users while telling data center operators they need not cease ongoing use of their items.

3. Five new destinations (§ 742.6)

A license is now required to or within Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The requirement does not apply where the ultimate consignee or end user is headquartered (or ultimately parented) in the United States and the exporter files monthly reports under new § 743.10. Applications are reviewed case by case.

4. Foundry and OSAT presumptions

Foundries and OSATs must presume that any “applicable advanced logic integrated circuit” (16/14 nm or below, or non-planar transistors) is a 3A090.a data center chip unless: (a) an approved or authorized designer attests otherwise; (b) the foundry attests to a transistor count below the thresholds; or (c) an approved OSAT does so. The Rule removes routes (b) and (c) for designers located in, or ultimately parented in, Country Groups D:1, D:4, or D:5 or the five new destinations. Separately, the Rule preserves, as a standalone requirement, a license requirement for a foundry or OSAT to ship such a chip, to or within any destination, where the designer is neither approved nor authorized.

The removal of routes (b) and (c) applies to designers “located in” the listed destinations, not only those parented there, so it appears to reach a US company’s design subsidiaries in Country Groups D:1, D:4, or D:5 or the five new destinations. US designers that rely on authorized IC designer status should note that, after December 31, 2026, that status requires a pending application for approved status and ends 180 days after the application is filed. Separately, shipping finished chips to an OSAT or customer in the five new destinations requires a license unless the recipient is headquartered (or ultimately parented) in the United States and the exporter files § 743.10 reports.

5. Rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule

The Rule removes the country tiers, License Exceptions AIA and LPP, the Data Center VEU, and model weight controls. It retains the worldwide scope of the advanced computing foreign direct product rule, which BIS says has “expansive application,” and License Exception ACM. Shipments that lose license-free eligibility and were en route aboard a carrier on November 19 may proceed if completed by December 21, 2026.

What Remains Unclear

The Rule leaves several significant questions open. It does not say whether existing providers may keep serving covered customers during the 90-day licensing window, or why the preamble limits commercial recommender access to 90 days when the regulatory text sets no limit. “Data center” is undefined, leaving unclear what obligations fall on co-location providers that do not own servers or neoclouds that do not operate data centers, and who “provides access” to compute. The Rule also does not explain how the 12 million TPP threshold is measured (e.g., per end user or in total), whether the diligence focus on ownership or control broadens the headquarters test, what standard governs “to or for” given that the 50% figure is only a non-binding example, whether US-located data centers are covered, or whether inference-only workloads raise the same concerns as training.

What the Industry Should Do

  • Chip exporters and distributors: Screen open and in-transit orders to the five new destinations and to data centers serving covered companies (the savings clause ends December 21); begin § 743.10 reporting for US-headquartered recipients (first report due December 1); issue the required end-use notices; and obtain data center KYC information before shipping, treating refusals as red flags.
  • Data center and cloud operators: Map customers against the headquarters and parent test, calculate aggregate TPP across linked facilities, assess whether the recommender exclusion is genuinely available, update customer contracts, and obtain a license, restructure, or wind down covered service by February 17, 2027. US-headquartered operators in the five destinations should note that § 743.10 reporting covers only the destination requirement, not § 744.24.
  • Foundries and OSATs: Re-screen design customers by location and ultimate parent, identify output now requiring a license, and support eligible customers’ approved IC designer applications ahead of the December 31, 2026 deadline.
  • AI developers renting compute: Expect data centers to push diligence, ownership certifications, audit rights, and use restrictions down to customers, particularly those with any PRC ownership or customers.
  • Lenders and investors: Diligence covered-customer exposure and licensing status in GPU-backed financings, and build export compliance into covenants and representations.
  • All parties: Conduct a privileged look-back on past shipments to non-US data centers with D:5/Macau-headquartered users, evaluate whether a voluntary self-disclosure is warranted, and consider comments on the open questions by January 19, 2027.

What to Watch

  • Trump-Xi talks: The leaders may meet again at the G20 in December, and the 2025 trade truce expires January 10, 2027; a deal could affect licensing or enforcement priorities.
  • FY2027 NDAA: Before the end of the year, Congress may finalize the NDAA, which may include versions of the AI OVERWATCH, Chip Security, MATCH, and Remote Access Security Acts.
Date Event
December 1, 2026 First § 743.10 monthly reports due
December 21, 2026 Savings clause expires for in-transit shipments
December 31, 2026 Approved IC designer application deadline
January 10, 2027 US-China trade truce expires
January 19, 2027 Comments on the Rule due
February 17, 2027 90-day transition for existing data center services ends

How We Can Help

Mayer Brown’s Sanctions & Export Controls team, which includes former senior BIS and Justice Department officials, can help clients assess exposure, prepare license applications and reports, conduct privileged look-backs, evaluate voluntary self-disclosures, update contracts and financing documents, and prepare comments to BIS.

 


 

1 91 Fed. Reg. 74970 (Nov. 19, 2026) (RIN 0694-AK50). Consistent with Executive Order 14434, the Rule uses “Super Intelligence” (“SI”) in place of “artificial intelligence”; this Legal Update uses “AI.”

2 BIS, “BIS Issues Rule Addressing Remote Access to American Super Intelligence Technology” (Nov. 16, 2026).

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