Serious Irregularity Challenges to Arbitral Awards: Lessons from October’s English Court Decisions
In October 2026, the English High Court decided four serious irregularity challenges under section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (as amended) (the "Act"). Two were dismissed, one succeeded in part and, in the fourth, the court found a serious irregularity—but has yet to decide whether it caused substantial injustice (both are needed for a challenge to succeed).
In this Legal Update, we examine these decisions and provide our key takeaways and observations for parties bringing or resisting section 68 challenges. All references are to the Act.
Key Takeaways
- Section 68 challenges succeeded for clear procedural failures: an issue left undecided and a case decided on a point never put to the parties. Parties should avoid complaints about the tribunal's findings of fact or assessment of the evidence in section 68 applications (these are not section 68 matters).
- Proving an irregularity is only half the battle, as applicants must also show substantial injustice, meaning the outcome of the arbitration might well have been different. In Heavey, that question now turns on the result of a separate challenge to an award in a related arbitration.
- When an arbitrator hears related disputes, undisclosed reliance on reasoning from the other case can lead to unfairness, and an award in one case can influence—and even determine—a challenge in the other.
- An ambiguity that a section 57 clarification could fix is unlikely to amount to serious irregularity. Where it is available and appropriate, parties should make a section 57 application for correction of an award (or an additional award) before bringing any court challenge (section 70(2)(b)).
- However, section 57 may not help in football disputes governed by FA Rule K: in what appears to be the first decision on the point, STN held that FA Rule K10.2 excludes a tribunal's section 57 powers.
- Remission to the original arbitrator is the default remedy (section 68(3)), but the court doubted it could send the matter to a new arbitrator without a parallel section 24 application to remove the original arbitrator. Parties seeking remission to a different arbitrator(s) should therefore prepare both applications.
Recap of Section 68 Framework
In all four cases, the court applied the familiar section 68 framework which requires both an irregularity within section 68(2) and substantial injustice. Section 68 is a "long-stop" for "extreme cases" where the "tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out for it to be corrected." The focus is on due process, not whether the decision was right, and awards are read "in a reasonable and commercial way."
Section 68 Decisions
1. STN v POR [2026] EWHC 2585 (Comm) (partly successful)
A footballer challenged an award in favour of his former agent issued under FA Rule K (the arbitration scheme for resolving disputes within English football). The award upheld the agent's claim for about £110,000 in commission and dismissed the player's two-limb counterclaim: (i) a £20,200 secret profit; and (ii) a breach of fiduciary duty in allowing the buying club to overpay by £100,000.
- Failure to deal with an issue (section 68(2)(d)): succeeded. The award analysed only the secret profit limb, then simply stated, "I therefore dismiss this second limb", so the overpayment limb was never addressed. Substantial injustice followed as "in the nature of things" the result might be different, even if any recovery might be modest.
- Section 57 not available. In what appears to be the first decision on the point, Butcher J held that FA Rule K10.2, which waives any "recourse to… arbitral body or any other body of any nature", excludes section 57 applications (as the wording was wide enough to refer to the tribunal itself), so section 70(2)(b) did not apply. Otherwise, section 57 would probably have been available, but he would have hesitated to refuse the challenge on that ground alone and would have considered extending time for a section 57 application.
- Other grounds: failed. The court rejected other arguments including that the arbitrator had adopted a theory of implied consent which was not part of the agent's pleaded case, that the arbitrator had made improper use of his private knowledge and that he failed to engage with the content of a witness's evidence. On the latter, the court held that a tribunal's assessment of the weight and relevance of witness evidence is not a section 68 matter (save in the most exceptional circumstances).
- Remedy: The overpayment limb was remitted to the same arbitrator. The judge doubted that he could remit to a different arbitrator without a section 24 application, and none had been made.
2. Stonegate Farmers Ltd v Heavey [2026] EWHC 2519 (Comm) (serious irregularity found; substantial injustice undecided)
This case is a sequel to Stonegate Farmers Ltd v Chucks Farm Ltd [2026] EWHC 742 (Comm), which we covered in our April Legal Update. In both cases, Stonegate, an egg packer, held the farm's Lion Code registration under an exclusive supply contract. The parties disputed when that contract had ended, and the farm claimed that Stonegate was in breach by refusing to release its Lion Code. Both disputes were heard by the same sole arbitrator under Stonegate's same standard terms, and neither farm argued for an implied term.
Chucks Farm: On 2 July 2025, the arbitrator found an implied term requiring Stonegate to release the Lion Code. Addressing Stonegate's section 68 challenge, HHJ Russen KC held that Stonegate had not been given an adequate opportunity to respond to the implied term point and remitted the award. After full argument, the arbitrator upheld the term again on 7 August 2026 (the "Remission Award"), which Stonegate is now challenging (the "Further Challenge").
Heavey: On 14 July 2025, the arbitrator found the same term against Stonegate and awarded Mr Heavey £116,114.78, referring to his finding in "other arbitral proceedings" without raising it with the parties. HHJ Pelling KC refused permission to appeal under section 69, but the section 68 challenge proceeded as follows:
- Serious irregularity: The parties had only argued a case based on express terms, so neither party had a reasonable opportunity to address the implied term. The arbitrator's undisclosed reliance on his Chucks Farm reasoning made this worse. In answering a section 57 application, he said his award rested on Stonegate's "admissions" of an implied term, but the court rejected this as "retrospective rationalisation" and identified the real reasoning from the award itself.
- Substantial injustice: The question was whether, if Stonegate was given a fair opportunity to address the implied term, the arbitrator might realistically have produced a different outcome. The earlier decisions of HHJ Pelling KC and HHJ Russen KC were relevant, but not binding. Had the Remission Award stood unchallenged, it would have shown "with virtual certainty" that the result would be the same, so there would be no substantial injustice. Because the Further Challenge might succeed, the judge adjourned the decision. He stressed that this approach arose only on the specific facts, where the same point, the same arbitrator and the same losing party featured in both cases.
3. Compagnia Italiana di Navigazione SpA v Grimaldi Euromed SpA [2026] EWHC 2737 (Comm) (dismissed)
Charterers challenged two LMAA awards for defective cylinder heads under BARECON 2001 charterparties. They said the tribunal had allowed an unpleaded case to be run at trial, permitted a new "workaround" theory and decided on unpleaded negligence.
Saini J rejected all three arguments finding that: (i) the tribunal had applied the correct legal test (after full argument); (ii) the charterers' own expert had addressed the issue; and (iii) read as a whole, the awards rested on the pleaded failure to maintain, not on negligence. The complaint ultimately depended on an alleged factual error, which is "forbidden territory" under section 68 as "it is not the function of the Court on a section 68 application to question factual findings." The alleged prejudice was "essentially speculative". The court dismissed the applications concluding that this was an attempt "to appeal against the Tribunal's conclusions on the evidence."
4. A, B, C & D v E [2026] EWHC 2590 (BP) (dismissed)
While this was mainly a section 67 challenge, which failed (the court confirmed that a unilateral agreement to arbitrate in a deed is an arbitration agreement under the Act), it raised a short section 68 point. The court held that the award's allegedly over-broad definition of "Country G Entities" was unambiguous when read against the parties' pleadings and List of Issues. In any event, the ambiguity could be clarified under section 57 and did not meet the very high threshold for serious irregularity.
Further, the defendant's undertaking to enforce only on the narrower meaning ruled out substantial injustice. The claimants said the undertaking would be unenforceable in Country G but offered "no good evidence" of this.
Concluding Comment
Even against a busy year for section 68 applications, it is unusual for judgments in one month to identify two significant procedural irregularities: failing to deal with an issue and deciding a case on a point not raised with the parties. Parties dealing with section 68 applications, including their interplay with section 57, should find our above Key Takeaways useful.
Interestingly, for parties resisting a challenge, A v E shows that an undertaking on enforcement, or an offer to join a section 57 clarification, can defeat the substantial injustice requirement.
Heavey highlights the risks of the same arbitrator hearing related disputes, including disclosure of the parallel award. However, the judge also provided useful guidance suggesting the arbitrator could have disclosed "the essence of the implied term found and the considerations thought to support it in another anonymised case," allowing the parties to respond while protecting confidentiality. As this case was adjourned, we will provide an update on the outcome.
If your business is considering, or facing a section 68 challenge, please contact any of the authors, or your usual Mayer Brown contact, should you need advice.








