Supreme Court Strikes Down Limits on Political Party Coordinated Expenditures

On June 30, 2026, the Supreme Court issued a consequential 6-3 ruling in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission (“NRSC”), striking down Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) limits on political party coordinated expenditures with political candidates. The Court held that such limits violate the First Amendment, reversing the Sixth Circuit and overturning Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (“Colorado II”).

This decision demonstrates once again the Court’s willingness to strike down campaign finance restrictions on First Amendment grounds, and is likely to result in increased coordinated expenditures between political parties and political campaigns. While political parties may now coordinate expenditures with candidates without limits, the Court emphasized that earmarking, disclosure, and anti-corruption laws remain in effect. Individual contribution limits to candidates and parties also still apply.

Background: FECA, Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee

FECA limits coordinated expenditures between political parties and candidates. See 52 U.S.C. §30116(d). Coordinated expenditures are those made “in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate.” 11 CFR §109.20(a). These limits are updated by the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), and depend on a state’s voting age population and the number of representatives in a state. For 2026, the FEC set the limits at $130,600 to $4,071,800 for Senate candidates and $65,300 to $130,600 for House candidates. 91 Fed. Reg. 10393–10394 (2026).

Previously, in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (“Colorado I”), a plurality of the Supreme Court held that limits on independent (uncoordinated) party expenditures were unconstitutional, but remanded the question of coordinated expenditure limits. In Colorado II, the Court upheld the coordinated limits, finding that “a party's coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits.” Colorado II at 465. Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that earmarking, disclosure, and quid pro quo laws adequately address circumvention concerns. This dissent formed the foundation of the majority’s reasoning in NRSC.

The plaintiffs, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, then-Senate candidate JD Vance, and then-Representative Steve Chabot, challenged the limits before the FEC. The en banc Sixth Circuit upheld the limits as controlled by Colorado II. Because the Trump Administration declined to defend FECA at the Supreme Court, the Court appointed amicus counsel to argue in support of the statute.

Supreme Court Ruling

In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Kavanaugh and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, the Court overruled Colorado II. The majority’s reasoning proceeded as follows:

• The Court rejected mootness arguments from amici and intervenors that Vice President Vance was no longer a candidate and no longer faced FEC enforcement. The Court dismissed these arguments, because of FECA’s limited private right of action and an active FEC campaign committee for VP Vance.
• Drawing from its own more recent precedent in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U. S. 185 (2014) and Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, the Court applied a “closely drawn” test, assessing “(i) the Government’s asserted interests in imposing the limits at issue and (ii) the fit between the limits and the Government’s asserted interests.” The Court determined that the limits at issue did not satisfy the test.
• The Court assessed four potential governmental interests, dismissing all but one. First, the Court dismissed the original intent of the limits to reduce wasteful and excessive campaign funding as “entirely inadequate under the First Amendment,” noting that no party defended this issue at the Court. Second, the Court dismissed concerns about undue political party influence on candidates as “not corruption,” but rather “successful advocacy of ideas in the political marketplace and representative government in a party system.” Referencing the language used by Justice Thomas in his Colorado I opinion. Third, the Court dismissed Colorado II’s concerns about undue donor influence in light of its more recent First Amendment precedent, particularly McCutcheon and Cruz, adding that “[t]he Court now recognizes ‘only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption,’” and that “‘Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.’”
  
  The only governmental interest that the Court determined worthy of consideration was “[w]hether FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures are permissible in order to prevent circumvention of the base limits on contributions to candidates via large contributions to parties that are earmarked (i.e., directed) to a candidate.” Addressing Colorado II, the Court criticized its “deferential scrutiny,” and instead elected to follow the “more demanding standards” under McCutcheon and Cruz to analyze whether political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are needed in light of separate earmarking and disclosure laws.
  
  Rejecting arguments that earmarking and disclosure rules are inadequate, the Court pointed to insufficient enforcement rather than statutory deficiency, and noted that modern technology has enhanced disclosure’s effectiveness. The Court concluded that base contribution limits, earmarking rules, and disclosure requirements “together serve the Government’s anti-circumvention interests here—without unduly restricting core political party speech.” By contrast, the Court stated that the coordinated-expenditure limits, operating as a “fourth line of defense,” impose a “severe and direct restriction on free speech” that is “disproportionate” and not “narrowly tailored” to the anti-circumvention interest.
• Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented, arguing that the majority’s opinion “ushers back in the same opportunities for quid pro quo corruption that the contribution limits were meant to check,” and that earmarking and disclosure laws alone cannot prevent corruption.
• The majority also addressed two concerns from this dissent: (1) stating that earmarking rules can address concerns of circumvention through joint fundraising committees; and (2) rejecting arguments for the necessity of coordinated-expenditure limits for the reasons stated in its opinion.

The decision is the latest landmark campaign finance decision by the Court, and its impact is likely to be felt as soon as November’s midterm elections, with substantially increased coordinated spending between political parties and candidates.