SmartestEnergy Business Ltd v Odeon Arcade Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1412

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Introduction

This judgment was delivered by the Court of Appeal at the beginning of November 2026, and provides an interesting analysis of what the words "occupied" and "unoccupied" mean in the statutory scheme set out first by the Electricity Act 1989, now known as the Electricity Code.

As will be seen, a rather robust and purposive approach to statutory interpretation was taken, and as such we would be unsurprised were the case to seek to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The case is a warning to landlords of multi-let buildings: ensure that you have a system in place to measure electricity used by individual tenants and a contractual arrangement to recover its cost.

Background

The Odeon Arcade is a shopping arcade in Leicester city centre, part of an elegant art deco development that has seen better days. The local press records that there is planning permission to develop it for housing and PBSA, fortunately with the façade preserved.

In 2021, Odeon Arcade Limited (the "Owner") bought the freehold of 1–9 Odeon Arcade (the "Premises"). The Premises, or at least the part relevant to this case, were supplied with electricity by SmartestEnergy Business Ltd ("Smartest") between 2021 and 2023, and in 2023 the supply was discontinued.

In April 2024, Smartest presented a winding up petition due to the Owner’s failure to pay unpaid charges of £106,914.25. The Owner applied to the Insolvency and Companies Court ("ICC") for an injunction restraining the advertisement of the winding up petition.

The Course of the Litigation

An applicant for an injunction restraining the publication of a winding up petition must show that pursuing the petition constitutes an abuse of the court’s insolvency process. A debtor must show that the debt is disputed in good faith and on substantial grounds. This is an important safeguard, as creditors will often use a winding-up petition as a way to pressurise recalcitrant debtors, even where there may be a defence or cross-claim.

The ICC judge found in favour of the Owner and Smartest appealed first to Cawson J in the High Court, and on failing there to the Court of Appeal. The panel consisted of Newey, Falk and Fancourt LLJ,with Newey LJ giving the substantive judgment. At the hearing, British Gas Trading Limited ("British Gas") was permitted to intervene as the case had wider industry implications.

The Arguments

The case revolved around the interpretation of paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 6 of the Electricity Act 1989, which states:

Deemed Contracts in Certain Cases
3(1) Where an electricity supplier supplies electricity to any premises otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, the supplier shall be deemed to have contracted with the occupier (or the owner if the premises are unoccupied) for the supply of electricity as from the time (“the relevant time”) when he began so to supply electricity.

Smartest’s invoice had been addressed to the Owner in respect of electricity supplied to the retail units 8a, 9a, and 12 at the Premises. Smartest’s evidence was that electricity was supplied to the Premises via a bulk meter, located in the basement. The retail units were then apparently supplied with electricity via submeters. Neither the Owner nor the retail unit tenants had a contract with Smartest, and it is likely (though not found as a matter of fact) that the retail units paid for electricity through their service charges.

Smartest’s contention was straightforward. It had supplied electricity and should be paid for the supply, and that paragraph 3(I) of schedule 6 of The Electricity Act 1989 allowed it to plead a “deemed contract” where a consumer had used electricity.

However, Smartest’s decision to go after the Owner had a major flaw. The retail units were not in fact unoccupied, but had had tenants trading from them. Smartest’s argument against the Owner therefore required the court to construe “unoccupied” as something other than its usual meaning.

The Owner’s argument was unattractive, but clear. The retail units in respect of which the invoices had been raised were occupied, and therefore it was the first limb of paragraph 3(I) that applied, not the default.

British Gas’s written submissions focused on the act of supplying electricity to premises. That act is complete when the electricity reaches those premises, usually—and in this case—at the meter point. The meter point is usually not part of the common parts in a multi-occupied building, but located in a locked room to which the tenants have no access. Tenants therefore cannot then be said to be in "occupation"; instead, it is the landlord who is in occupation, or in default, the owner.

The Judgment of the Court of Appeal

As a senior appellate court, the Court of Appeal must lift its eyes from the black letter of the law, and look at the wider picture. Had it allowed the Owner’s argument to succeed, then it would have potentially opened the door to every multi-let building owner and its occupants reassessing their positions in respect of liability for the costs of electricity.

Which premises were "the premises" relevant to the legislation?

The ICC judge had concluded, and British Gas had submitted, that the relevant premises were the three retail units. On this basis, under paragraph 3(I) each occupier was liable for the electricity it consumed,.

Newey LJ disagreed, and found that the relevant premises were the Premises themselves.

In coming to this conclusion, the learned Lord Justice referenced paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 7 of the Electricity Act 1999, which speaks of the supply of electricity being through" a meter, rather than "to" a meter. Additionally, paragraph 1(3) states that the location of the meter is a matter to be determined by the authorized supplier, who might also decide to place it outside of the premises supplied with electricity.

Having concluded that the location of a bulk meter to several premises was not determinative as to financial liability, Newey LJ had to consider what this meant for the Owner’s liability for the debt.

Determination of liability for the electricity debt

Newey LJ considered three possibilities, namely that:

  1. All tenants were parties to one deemed contract and were jointly and severally liable for the whole debt;
  2. All tenants were parties to one deemed contract with an implied term limiting liability to actual usage; and
  3. The owner was party to the deemed contract and liable for the whole supply.

Tenants’ Joint and several liability for the whole debt under a deemed contract

Newey LJ concluded that this was an unlikely interpretation of the statutory scheme, as each tenant would effectively be a co-guarantor for the liability of its neighbours. He reasoned that this would require clear statutory intention, which was absent.

Tenants’ Joint and several liability for the whole debt with an implied term limiting liability to usage

The learned lord justice felt that implying a term into an improbable interpretation of a statute to make it "fair" was unnecessary, and that it would be better to revisit the interpretation entirely.

Deemed contract with the owner

Newey LJ preferred the interpretation that the Owner was liable for the whole supply. The Owner would generally know which areas the bulk meter served, who occupied them and on what terms. It could therefore arrange recovery of individual consumption costs, including by installing sub-meters. A deemed contract also substitutes for an express contract; the landlord was the only plausible contracting party for the whole building’s supply. Accordingly, "unoccupied" meant that there was no single occupier of the entirety, despite occupation of individual units.

Conclusion

This is clearly the "common sense" result, although purists might baulk at Newey LJ’s adopted rules of thumb to achieve it. For example, Lord Nicholls in Graysim Holdings Ltd v P & O Property Holdings Ltd [1996]:

“the concept of occupation is not a legal term of art, with one single and precise legal meaning applicable in all circumstances” and that “[i]ts meaning varies according to the subject matter.”

Or again, Lady Rose in Cornerstone Telecommunications Infrastructure Ltd v Compton Beauchamp Estates Ltd [2022] stating:

“the starting point here is not to try to define the word ‘occupier’ and then allow that definition to mandate how the regime established by the code works. The correct approach is to work out how the regime is intended to work and then consider what meaning should be given to the word ‘occupier’ so as best to achieve that goal.” 

The willingness of the court to bend the clear meaning of a word to achieve a statutory purpose is unsettling. It contains a clear message to landlords of multi-lets: good housekeeping is essential, and specific agreements with occupiers are better than deemed contracts. 

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