Fundamental Research, National Security, and the Quiet Shift Facing Universities

Universities and research institutes have long relied on the protections for “fundamental research” under national security laws to enable international collaboration in open science. Through provisions dating back to the height of the Cold War, basic and applied research has been carved out of restrictions on the transfer of intangible technology to foreign nationals (known as “deemed exports”). Recent actions by the US government suggest the potential narrowing of this long-standing approach when projects or collaborators present elevated national security risks. Particularly, as US-China relations continue to evolve, university counsel should pay close attention to policy developments in Washington that may restrict their open and collaborative research environments—especially if such research is federally funded—and raise concern among researchers and students, who are already on edge.

Fundamental Research and Export Controls

The concept of “fundamental research” traces back to the Cold War. In the still-current National Security Decision Directive 189 (“NSDD-189”), the Reagan Administration established that the output of fundamental research—meaning “basic and applied research in science and engineering,” whose results are “ordinarily published and shared broadly within the research community”—would remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible.¹ Consistent with this Directive, US regulations governing transfers of “dual-use” technology (i.e., technology with both civil and military application) reflect this conceptual foundation.

Technology that arises during or results from fundamental research is not subject to US dual-use export controls when it is intended to be published.² Generally, as long as researchers do not accept restrictions for national security or proprietary reasons and the research results are ordinarily “published and shared broadly within the research community,” the EAR permit international collaboration even with nationals of countries of concern.³ When technology does not qualify as fundamental research, an export license may be required for technology transfers to foreign nationals, depending on the nature of the technology, nationality of the recipient, recipient’s institutional affiliation, and how the recipient will use the transferred technology. Such technology transfers may be intangible and may occur through access, training, or collaboration.

Focus on Illicit Technology Transfer and International Scientific Collaboration

In the last five years, cracks have started to appear in the fundamental research foundation, which could carry over into more restrictive export control measures. Policymakers have begun to ask how to preserve the benefits of open science while imposing safeguards—especially as related to China and its state‑directed talent recruitment programs. The NSDD-189 premise that the openness of fundamental research at US universities is a strategic advantage, not a vulnerability, is under pressure. US government attention is increasingly focused on illicit technology transfer and government-sponsored technology and talent acquisition within the U.S. research ecosystem, mainly tied to activities of the Government of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”).

Issued in the last week of the first Trump Administration, National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (“NSPM-33”) established that the US open-research environment was under threat: even “[w]hile maintaining an open environment to foster research discoveries and innovation that benefit our Nation and the world,” the United States would also “protect intellectual capital, discourage research misappropriation, and ensure responsible management of United States taxpayer dollars.”⁴ The Biden Administration agreed with NSPM-33’s premise and issued implementing guidance for federal agencies to collect additional information from universities receiving federal funding and to require research security programs at such institutions.

In the last year, the National Science Foundation established requirements restricting awards to institutions and individuals associated with malign foreign talent recruitment programs and mandating research security training. At the start of 2026, the Department of Education launched a new portal for universities to report foreign funding as required under Section 117 of the of the Higher Education Act of 1965. The so-called “Section 117 portal” is intended to increase visibility into significant foreign gifts and contracts to U.S. institutions so that institutions and agencies can assess risk and enhance compliance. On February 23, the Department of Education further announced a partnership with the Department of State. Under the partnership, the Department of State will support the Department of Education in managing the Section 117 portal, “and use its national security and foreign national academic admissions expertise to review and assess the industry’s compliance with the law, share data with the public and federal stakeholders, and identify potential threats.” Within the same week of the portal’s debut, the Department of Defense’s Research and Engineering arm also announced new initiatives designed to “preserve the research and technological superiority of the US military” by strengthening security measures applicable to fundamental research.

The BIOSECURE Act, enacted in January 2026 as part of the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”), exemplifies this expanding government-wide approach. The Act prohibits federal agencies from procuring biotechnology equipment or services from designated "biotechnology companies of concern" (“BCCs”), and bars federal contractors and grant recipients from using such equipment or services in connection with federal work. For universities and research institutions that have partnered with BCCs for genomic sequencing, contract research, or manufacturing services, the BIOSECURE Act creates new compliance obligations and may require transitioning to alternative providers, with a five-year safe harbor period for existing contracts.

These actions followed release last fall of a House of Representatives report on “problematic partnerships” between US universities and the PRC. Congressional reports and committee commentary have described specific pathways—such as joint institutes, foreign talent programs, and university partnerships—through which US-funded research and know‑how can be leveraged by the PRC’s military‑civil fusion system, urging tighter due diligence and guardrails by agencies and universities.⁵

In one recent example, on February 19, Chairman John Moolenaar of the House Select Committee on China and Chairman Chuck Grassley of the Senate Judiciary Committee jointly sent letters to NASA and the FBI drawing attention to a recent House investigative report containing allegations that a named Stanford University professor had worked on NASA-funded research in collaboration with a researcher from the University of Science and Technology of China, in potential violation of a law barring NASA use of federal funds for cooperation with PRC companies or the PRC. At the same time, the professor held a position at the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics’s (CAEP) Center for High Pressure Science and Technology Advanced Research (HPSTAR). (CAEP and HPSTAR are on the US Entity List.) The letters also noted that of the approximately 58 co-authored publications by this professor that acknowledge Department of Energy funding or support, 31 were with HPSTAR (since 2013).

Other legislation to watch includes the draft Protecting American Research and Talent Act, introduced in the House (H.R. 5253) and Senate (S. 2755) in September 2025, which would provide that no federal funds be awarded to a university for the “specific purposes of conducting fundamental research in collaboration with a covered entity,” which is defined broadly and includes any PRC college or university that conducts research or other activities in support of national defense capabilities, as well as entities identified under Section 1286 of the FY19 NDAA. Section 1286, among other things, directs the Pentagon to work with academic institutions performing defense research and engineering activities to protect against undue foreign influence and unwanted transfers of sensitive technology and to publish lists identifying foreign entities and programs associated with problematic activity and malign foreign talent recruitment programs. The “Section 1286 List” now influences grant eligibility, disclosure obligations, and institutional reputation. Moreover, as in this proposed legislation, the Section 1286 List forms a basis for other federal research‑security restrictions, enabling a government‑wide approach to identifying and managing higher‑risk collaborations.⁶

Going even further, one draft amendment to the FY26 NDAA that was not enacted would have required universities conducting Pentagon-funded research “relating to an item subject to [dual-use export] controls” to identify and assess covered researchers, track their activities after leaving university employment, and report any subsequent work with designated foreign entities of concern to the Department of Commerce. Covered researchers were to have included university employees who conducted research relating to dual-use export-controlled items for the Pentagon “as a principal investigator or as a member of a team receiving a Department of Defense grant for [such] research.” The researchers themselves would also have been subject to ongoing reporting obligations for a defined period following departure. Although ultimately not included in the NDAA, the proposal reflects growing congressional focus on knowledge-transfer risks in the higher education environment.

Consistent with this dynamic policy environment, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) in November 2025 issued a government‑wide Request for Information (“RFI”) seeking input on how to “accelerate the American scientific enterprise” while addressing research security, explicitly asking, “How can the Federal government strengthen research security to protect sensitive technologies and dual-use research while minimizing compliance burdens on researchers?” The RFI underscores that federal changes under consideration extend beyond defense agencies and may recalibrate disclosure, data-sharing, and institutional program expectations across the research ecosystem.

These actions are part of a broader effort by the US government to intensify scrutiny of foreign influence in the higher education sector, recognizing that such influence could lead to illicit technology transfer. Congress has advanced legislation such as the DETERRENT Act to significantly expand and tighten foreign gift and contract disclosure requirements for universities, while the April 2025 Executive Order on Transparency Regarding Foreign Influence at American Universities directed more aggressive enforcement of existing reporting obligations. Taken together, these measures signal a growing expectation that universities play an active role in safeguarding against national security risks.

What Universities and Research Institutions Need to Know Now

The US government continues to affirm the importance of fundamental research, while simultaneously redefining the conditions under which openness is acceptable. For universities and research institutions, the challenge is not to retreat from international collaboration, but to engage deliberately, informed by evolving legal and policy expectations.

The most durable path to sustaining academic openness amid intensifying strategic competition is to treat research security as an enabler of innovation rather than a constraint. Collaboration remains viable when security risks, and not just legal risks, are identified early. In practice, this means:

• Research security and export controls are converging. What were once separate compliance silos—export controls, grants management, research security—are increasingly interconnected. Expect more award terms to require security plans, personnel disclosures, and post‑award monitoring aligned to risk. Institutions that proactively assess their research security, export control, and partner-vetting frameworks will be best-positioned to preserve academic openness while navigating a more complex national security environment.
• With added contractual requirements comes increased exposure under the False Claims Act for failing to meet them. Universities and research institutes receiving federal funds will need appropriate compliance programs, including whistleblower mechanisms designed to encourage internal reporting (over qui tam actions) and should be prepared to consider making voluntary disclosures to head off more severe enforcement actions and penalties.
• Partner due diligence is essential.The Pentagon’s guidance and Section 1286 List caution institutions about engagements with listed entities and frame the lists as part of ongoing efforts to counter unwanted technology transfer.⁷

Conclusion

International scientific collaboration is increasingly viewed through a national security lens and subject to heightened US government concerns. Universities cannot assume the status quo will continue without additional limitations.

How Mayer Brown Can Help

Mayer Brown’s Export Controls & Sanctions, Public Policy, Regulatory & Government Affairs, and National Security practices have extensive experience helping clients navigate complex, high-stakes, and fast-evolving regulatory environments. We manage interconnected regulatory and political risks by pairing deep national security law expertise with robust public policy and advocacy capabilities. Institutions of higher education and related entities can benefit from the experienced counsel Mayer Brown provides in this fluid national security landscape.

¹ National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information, National Security Decision Directive 189, Sep. 21, 1985 (further stating that “where the national security requires control, the mechanism for control of information generated during federally-funded fundamental research . . . at . . .universities . . . is classification” and that “[n]o restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. Statutes”).

² 15 C.F.R. § 734.8 (defining fundamental research as “research in science, engineering, or mathematics, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the research community, and for which the researchers have not accepted restrictions for proprietary or national security reasons”). 

³ Id.

⁴ Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Supported Research and Development National Security Policy, National Security Presidential Memorandum 33, Jan. 14, 2021.

⁵ See, e.g., Containment Breach: The U.S. Department of Energy’s Failures in Research Security and Protecting Taxpayer-Funded Research from Foreign Exploitation, House Select Committee on China, Dec. 17, 2025; Joint Institutes, Divided Loyalties: How the Chinese Communist Party Exploits U.S. University Partnerships to Empower China’s Military and Repression, House Select Committee on China & Committee on Education and the Workforce, Sept. 11, 2025; CCP on the Quad: How American Taxpayers and Universities Fund the CCP’s Advanced Military and Technological Research, House Select Committee on China, Sept. 23, 2024.

⁶ For example, DoD’s 2023 Policy on Risk‑Based Security Reviews and its 2025 Component Decision Matrix align with the National Science and Technology Council’s NSPM‑33 implementation guidance on National Security Strategy for United States Government-Supported Research and Development and Guidelines for Federal Research Agencies Regarding Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs.

⁷ Complementary federal guidance, such as the NCSC Safeguarding Academia bulletin, recommends robust screening, access segmentation, and governance to manage collaboration risk.