Foreign-Produced UAS and Critical Components Added to FCC’s Covered List

On December 22, 2025, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) announced that it would add all uncrewed aircraft systems (“UAS” or “drones”) and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries to the FCC’s Covered List, based on a National Security Determination (the “Determination”) issued the day before. Although the decision does not impact a consumer’s ability to continue using drones they previously purchased or acquired (or prevent the sale, import or marketing of models previously authorized),¹ the FCC will not issue new equipment authorizations for covered items, which will broadly cut off future sales and new deployments of covered items in the United States in the absence of exceptions by the Departments of War or Homeland Security.  

Determination Background

Based on a number of factors (including, e.g., the widespread use of drones in Ukraine and upcoming, high-visibility/high-attendance events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup and 2028 Summer Olympics) the second Trump Administration has made drones a key policy focus. As part of this effort, the White House released Executive Orders 14305 (Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty, addressing the security threat posed by drones) and 14307 (Unleashing American Drone Dominance, designed to bolster the domestic drone industry). Together, these Executive Orders, along with the 2025 National Security Strategy (which notes the asymmetry between “low-cost drones” and drone defense systems), and a July investigation by the Department of Commerce into the national security effects of imports of UAS, articulate and highlight security threats posed by drones.

To address these threats, the White House convened an “executive branch interagency body,” which released the Determination with the following key elements:

• UAS produced in a foreign country pose a higher, and unacceptable, risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of US persons.
• Foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components, including any associated software,² should be included on the FCC’s Covered List, unless the Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given UAS, class of UAS, or critical component does not pose such risks.
• Included in the recommendation are all communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in Section 1709(a)(1) of the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act.³

Pursuant to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, 47 U.S.C. § 1601(c) (“STCNA”), the FCC has limited discretion over the Covered List and must act on qualifying external determinations, including those made by an “executive branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise.” Immediately following the Determination’s release, the FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau added the recommended UAS, UAS critical components, and listed communications and video surveillance equipment and services to the Covered List.

Determination/Listing Details

The addition of foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components to the Covered List is unprecedented, because it is the first time that the FCC added an entire category of equipment or services, defined by the place of production (as opposed to identifying products by specific companies). Other key points of this addition follow:

• Listing hinges on the “foreign-produced” nature of the items. As a result, drones and critical components manufactured by American companies in overseas facilities appear to be subject to the restrictions. Conversely, with certain exceptions, drones and critical components manufactured within the United States by foreign companies are not subject to the restrictions.⁴ However, the inclusion of critical components, including associated software, may significantly limit the components that may be integrated into a drone manufactured in the United States. Notably, the Determination does not define “foreign-produced,” leaving questions about which portions of the production process, from initial design to final assembly, must occur within the United States for a drone or critical component to be considered produced in the United States.
• Foreign-produced items are covered unless either the Department of War or Department of Homeland Security makes a “specific determination” that a certain listed UAS or critical component does not present a security risk. It is not immediately clear, however, how the Departments will make these determinations or how impacted companies will be able to apply for those exceptions.⁵
• Going beyond the traditional national security risks identified above, the Determination also recommends listing foreign-produced drones and critical components to support and promote US domestic manufacturing capabilities: “To ensure American companies are able to meet both peacetime and wartime demand, the US UAS industry cannot rely on foreign-produced UAS critical components.”
• The Determination bolsters the national security impetus of its recommendation by noting the “inherently dual-use” nature of drones: “they are both commercial platforms and potentially military or paramilitary sensors and weapons.”
• Notably, neither the FCC’s Public Notice nor the Determination references “countries of concern” or “foreign adversaries” while describing the risk of listed drones or critical components.⁶ All foreign products are treated equally by the Determination.

Procedural Distinction

As indicated above, STCNA requires the FCC to add communications equipment or services to the Covered List after receiving a “determination” from any one of the following: “an appropriate national security agency,”⁷ an “executive branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise” (such as the FASC),⁸ the Department of Commerce (pursuant to its ICTS supply chain authority under Executive Order No. 13873), or Congress, in the form of legislation identifying equipment or service to be covered (such as in the Section 889 list included in the 2019 NDAA). Previous additions to the Covered List typically followed either Congressional determinations (reflected in an NDAA) or recommendations by Team Telecom (which was formalized by Executive Order 13913). And as we discussed in prior Legal Updates, the Director of National Intelligence only recently published the first exclusion and removal order based on a recommendation by the FASC (which has not been adopted by the FCC), and, in some cases, after months of deliberation and rulemaking, the Commerce Department has used its supply chain authorities to regulate connected vehicles and to ban Kaspersky anti-virus software.

The White House convened the “interagency body” that made the Determination, a departure from previous practice. It is not public knowledge which agencies or officials comprised the interagency body, but the White House’s involvement likely reflects a desire by the Trump Administration to direct the process from the highest levels of the Executive Branch and may set a precedent for future determinations. The process used here probably proved faster and more nimble than prior interagency processes, and it has resulted in the broadest supply chain restriction of its kind.

Key Takeaways

The sweeping nature of Covered List restrictions on foreign-produced drones and critical components could have significant impacts, particularly on domestic drone and component manufacturers and industries reliant on foreign drone technology. Specifically, US manufacturers of drones must carefully vet supply chains to ensure that critical components are not subject to Covered List restrictions based on their foreign production (or they may face making false assertions in seeking an equipment authorization for the assembled products).⁹ Additionally, manufacturers of drones and critical components subject to Covered List restrictions and potentially eligible for Department of War or Homeland Security determinations should watch for instructions on how to seek these “whitelist” determinations. Finally, the Commerce Department’s investigation could lead to other restrictions on imports of UAS, such as tariffs or numerical limits to encourage domestic production.

Looking ahead, this Determination—authored by an unidentified group of executive branch participants—lowers the procedural bar for additions to the Covered List and suggests future additions may apply to entire categories of foreign products. Moreover, to the extent the Trump Administration views the pursuit of domestic self-sufficiency as a basis to invoke national security, the Covered List process used here could be a potent tool to favor domestic sources of supply. This process could also signal the White House’s interest in consolidating administrative power typically wielded by other executive branch agencies. Foreign manufacturers of communications-related technology products (and those that rely on them) should take notice and prepare for the possibility of more accelerated, and broader, restrictions on their products in the United States.

¹ The FCC noted that “This update to the Covered List does not prohibit the import, sale, or use of any existing device models the FCC previously authorized. This action does not affect any previously-purchased drone.”

² “UAS critical components” includes, but is not limited to the following UAS components and any associated software: data transmission devices; communications systems; flight controllers; ground control stations and UAS controllers; navigation systems; sensors and cameras; batteries and battery management systems; and motors.

³ Section 1709(a)(1) lists communications or video surveillance equipment (and associated services, including the provision of software) produced by DJI Technologies, Autel Robotics, and any of these company’s subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, or joint ventures (this list includes entities holding technology sharing or licensing agreements with the previously listed entities).

⁴ The Section 1709(a)(1) additions of DJI Technologies and Autel Robotics communications and video surveillance equipment and services to the Covered List yield restrictions that are applicable to all covered equipment and services, regardless of production location.

⁵ The Department of War (Defense Contract Management Agency) maintains a “Blue UAS List” of drones that are “compliant with current law and policy, validated as cyber-secure, and are available for DoW purchase and operation.” This list is mentioned in Section 9 of Executive Order 14307.

⁶ An FCC “National Security Advisory” dated October 14, 2025 discusses the Covered List and notes that “Most of this equipment and services are closely tied to the foreign adversaries, like China….” (emphasis added)

⁷ The term “appropriate national security agency” means the Department of Homeland Security; the Department of Defense; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the National Security Agency; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 47 U.S.C. § 1608(2).

⁸ Federal Acquisition Security Counsel, established under 41 U.S.C. § 1322(a).

⁹ All applicants seeking equipment authorization from the FCC must certify that the equipment is not prohibited from receiving an equipment authorization by virtue of being “covered equipment.” 47 C.F.R. § 2.911(d)(5)(i).