FARA Enforcement in 2025: From the Bondi Memo and NSPM-7 to Case Resolutions and Quieter Administrative Developments

FARA enforcement pivoted in 2025, but it did not halt. FARA enforcement continued with a shift in focus that likely foreshadows evolving alignment with other White House priorities.

The Bondi Charging Memo & NSPM-7

Two high-level Executive Branch memoranda formed bookends of FARA enforcement last year.

On her first day in office, the Attorney General issued more than a dozen policy memoranda to Department of Justice (DOJ) staff. One of which, a General Policy Regarding Charging, Plea Negotiations, and Sentencing, announced a realignment of DOJ’s resources to target threats prioritized by this administration (such as illegal immigration, transnational organized crime, and fentanyl and opioids). As part of that revision of priorities, the Attorney General announced that DOJ was disbanding the Foreign Influence Task Force (the “FITF”), an FBI initiative to counter malign foreign influence by foreign governments that was born of the Bureau’s efforts to investigate Russia’s activities during the 2016 presidential election. Prior to the FITF, the Bureau’s Counterintelligence Division concentrated on more traditional forms of espionage (i.e., the surreptitious collection of national security information), as opposed to efforts to influence policy or public opinion, but the FITF was the investigative pipeline that led DOJ to open a number of criminal foreign influence investigations in the first Trump and Biden administrations. The Attorney General explained that eliminating the FITF was an effort “[t]o free resources to address more pressing priorities, and end risks of further weaponization and abuses of prosecutorial discretion.” Meanwhile, the Department’s prosecutors were directed to limit criminal charges under FARA and a related statute, 18 U.S.C. § 951, “to instances of alleged conduct similar to more traditional espionage by foreign government actors,” and to “focus on civil enforcement, regulatory initiatives, and public guidance.”

The Bondi Memo, as it became known in FARA circles (even though it was not the only memo issued that day), de-emphasized criminal foreign influence cases of the recent past, casting them as a form of prosecutorial overreach and weaponization. Instead, as we discuss below, the continuation of some prosecutions begun in the prior administration, and the dismissal of one, suggests that prosecutorial discretion will turns less on whether the conduct involved espionage in the traditional sense than on whether the conduct was undertaken on behalf of a foreign government, especially a so-called adversary, and whether it involved surreptitious or unsanctioned behavior by a government employee.

Later on, in late September 2025, President Donald Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum, Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence, which identified a recent uptick in political violence as the “culmination of sophisticated, organized campaigns,” and called for a “new law enforcement strategy that investigates all participants in these criminal and terroristic conspiracies — including the organized structures, networks, entities, organizations, funding sources, and predicate actions behind them.” Among other things, it directed the National Joint Terrorism Task Forces (a network of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies led by FBI) to pursue FARA and money laundering charges against three types of subjects that might be vulnerable to such charges for supporting “domestic terrorism”: non-governmental organizations, American citizens residing abroad, and Americans with “close ties to foreign governments, agents, citizens, foundations, or influence networks.” And it also directs the Department of Justice to prosecute “all Federal crimes, to the maximum extent permissible by law, related to such investigations.”

Resolution & Pursuit: the Evolution of Criminal Enforcement Actions in 2025

Most of the public enforcement of FARA (and related foreign influence statutes) consisted of the continuation of investigations and prosecutions that began before this administration and have, with one notable exception, proceeded in the ordinary course.

• Linda Sun: In June 2025, DOJ obtained a superseding indictment of this former aide to New York Governors Andrew Cuomo and Kathy Hochul, adding fraud and bribery charges to criminal FARA charges that DOJ had brought in September 2024. As concerns FARA, DOJ contended that Sun was acting as an agent of the Chinese government when she made decisions about whether New York State officials would meet with Taiwan officials and in otherwise influencing official communications about matters of interest to the Chinese government (such as the Uighurs). The case went to trial, but the presiding district judge declared a mistrial in December 2025 after jurors deadlocked on all counts. The government has indicated it intends to retry the case.
• Pras Michel: Having been convicted in 2023 for his role in an unregistered, back-channel lobbying campaign to influence the first Trump Administration to drop an investigation of the embezzlement from 1MDB and to send a Chinese national back to China, Michel was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment in November 2025. (Some other co-conspirators had previously been pardoned.) At his sentencing, his defense attorney argued that no FARA case would be brought today based on those facts, but the prosecutor rejected that claim.
• Dale Bendler: In April 2025, Bendler pleaded guilty to having acted as an agent of a foreign principal during the time he was a CIA contractor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 219—a statute that prohibits public officials from acting as agents under FARA, regardless of whether they have registered—as well as mishandling classified information. Bendler admitted that he surreptitiously worked for a lobbying firm as a consultant while that lobbying firm was retained on behalf of foreign principals to influence the US government. On behalf of one principal who was under investigation in a foreign country, he wrote an internal memorandum describing options for influencing US government and public audiences, and attempted himself to influence US government officials (as well as foreign officials) on behalf of the principal, and on behalf of a second foreign principal, he tried to persuade the US government to issue his client a visa. All the while, Bendler exploited his access to CIA resources to assist his work as a consultant for those lobbying clients. In addition to being sentenced to a year in prison, Bendler agreed to register under FARA.
• Sue Terry: Terry is a former CIA analyst who worked at academic institutions and think tanks after leaving government. She was indicted in July 2024 for violating FARA. According to the indictment, Terry worked at the direction and control of a South Korean intelligence officer in advocating for policy positions, including in published articles and during media appearances, disclosed nonpublic US government information to South Korean intelligence officers, and facilitated access for South Korean government officials to US government officials. Terry has moved to dismiss the indictment and to suppress evidence, which motion is scheduled to be argued in January 2026. Although Terry did not invoke the Bondi Memo, she has argued that she was unfairly singled out for criminal prosecution for work allegedly on behalf of one of the United States’s closest allies, and in response, DOJ steadfastly maintained that FARA is appropriately applied to activities on behalf of any undisclosed principal, not merely foreign adversary nations.
• Daniel Rivera:Former Congressman Rivera was indicted in December 2024 on charges of failing to register under FARA and money laundering, in connection with an alleged scheme to provide consulting and lobbying services to a sanctioned Venezuelan businessman. According to the indictment, Rivera sought to lobby US government officials to have the businessman removed from the sanctions list. From the docket, the case appears to be proceeding through discovery.
• Henry Cuellar: Representative Cuellar was indicted in May 2024 on charges of bribery and acting as a foreign agent while serving as a public official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 219. The indictment alleged that he accepted bribes from an Azerbaijani energy company and a Mexican bank to influence US foreign policy in favor of Azerbaijan and to influence legislative activity (and high-ranking US Executive Branch officials) in ways beneficial to the bank. In July 2025, prosecutors moved to dismiss the FARA-related allegations because, “for this particular case, the § 219-related counts and allegations should be dismissed or stricken” in light of the Bondi Memo and its admonition to reserve criminal FARA charges for “instances of alleged conduct similar to more traditional espionage by foreign government actors.” (President Trump would later pardon Cuellar before trial on the remaining charges.)

For the most part, therefore, DOJ did not abandon or suspend criminal enforcement of FARA, and indeed, it continued prosecuting most pending cases. In many, but not all, of the cases (Sun, Bendler, and Terry), the defendants are accused of exploiting access to nonpublic information, and Sun and Terry are accused of working directly for a foreign government. All three cases also involve allegations of surreptitious activity by unelected officials (or former officials), who were acting without the apparent blessing of elected officials. The Cuellar dismissal may, therefore, reflect as much about the Administration’s views on when it is appropriate or desirable to prosecute elected officials as it is about the application of FARA, specifically.¹

Advisory Opinions

Since 2018, DOJ began publishing anonymized versions of the advisory opinions it issued in response to requests from potential registrants. For the last several years, DOJ has published the opinions on its website in batches every few months. None were publicized in 2025 until September, when a law firm used keyword searches to identify 17 advisory opinions on DOJ’s website. The opinions (which we analyze below) appear to have been issued to the requesting parties, then redacted and staged for public release, but they are no longer publicly accessible.

Several themes emerge from the opinions (which we summarize in more granular detail in the table at the end of this Legal Update).

First, the single most important factor in determining whether activity would qualify under the commercial exemption (or domestic interests exemption) is the connection vel non between the foreign principal (and the activities within the United States) and a foreign government. In multiple matters, the Unit determined that the “private and nonpolitical” commercial exemption at 22 U.S.C. § 613(d)(1) applied to US agents assisting a foreign individual or private company with purely commercial aims, including facilitating a visa for private travel and arranging meetings devoted to private‑sector business development, provided the activities did not directly promote the public or political interests of a foreign government and did not entail political activities. Even a US firm proposing to introduce a foreign vendor to US officials, to raise awareness of services for potential government procurements in a third country, was exempt under § 613(d)(1), because the work furthered bona fide trade or commerce and did not promote a foreign government’s public or political interests. In making these decisions, the Unit often specifically remarked on the lack of state ownership of foreign companies, suggesting it may be more difficult for foreign government-owned companies to qualify for the commercial exemptions.

By contrast, the Unit denied that the exemption applied where activities plainly served foreign sovereign interests (even if a foreign government was not the principal, and even if the benefits were largely financial).

• In an April 2025 opinion, DOJ opined that a US firm retained by a foreign company under contracts with two foreign governments to recover allegedly stolen sovereign assets should register, because the work (including sharing evidence with US agencies to spur investigations) would naturally directly benefit a foreign government’s coffers.
• A US consultant advocating for expanded energy sanctions and aid allocations in alignment with a foreign non-governmental organization’s (NGO) policy agenda was advised to register in October 2024, because a particular foreign government appeared to be the principal beneficiary of its efforts.
• The US subsidiary of a foreign, state-owned media company (which intended to reach that country’s diaspora in the United States) was urged to register October 2024, in large part because the foreign media organization was used to further the country’s “strategic goals,” including promoting repatriation and attracting direct investment. This was so even though the US company represented that its content would be “non-political, cultural and educational programming.” (Contrast that outcome with a US movie company, 20% owned by a foreign ambassador—and founded by an embassy employee—which qualified for the commercial exemption in December 2024, because it promised to operate as a for-profit company and not promote a foreign government’s interests.)

Second, the FARA Unit is applying a hybrid test under § 613(d), hewing more closely to the text of the implementing regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 5.304 in some cases than others, and sometimes also requiring that the US agents be advancing their own interests at least as much as their foreign principals’.

• For example, a US nonprofit planning to co‑host a conference abroad with a foreign research institute, to be amplified through US media and policymaker outreach, was advised to register in October 2024, in part because the conference would directly advance the foreign institute’s interests. No domestic interests were identified opinion, but neither was any connection to a foreign government (which is what § 5.304 requires). Instead, the applicable regulation is not discussed.
• In analyzing whether political activities to promote two commercial joint ventures between a US and foreign company could qualify for the commercial exemption, the FARA Unit (in January 2025) analyzed both the applicable factors under the regulation as well as the roughly even division between US and foreign owners of the JVs to find that the activities did not “predominantly” serve a foreign interest.
• An employee of an intergovernmental organization (IGO) was advised to register in May 2025, because the IGO did not identify any “particular domestic interests,” and the IGO could not qualify for the commercial exemption under § 5.304, because it was not a corporation.
• On the other hand, a US organization co‑developed to “build on the work” of a foreign entity and engaged in US policy advocacy could satisfy the “domestic interests” test (in June 2025) if its activities directly advanced its US mission, focused entirely on domestic harms, were not directed by a foreign government or party, and did not directly promote foreign public or political interests.

Third, activity undertaken by lawyers receives much more latitude, even outside a traditional, on-the-record context (like a courtroom).

• In October 2024, the FARA Unit advised that a US law firm’s advocacy on behalf of a foreign bank before US agencies would not require registration (even though the channels were informal, and even though the topics involved demonstrating compliance with US policy).
• The outside counsel to a foreign embassy in Washington, which provided litigation risk assessments and strategic legal advice, was advised in June 2025 that it was not engaging in covered activities. (The FARA Unit did not even reach the legal exemption of § 613(g).)
• In another June opinion, a US patent attorney proposing to conduct search and advisory work for a foreign individual was told registration was unnecessary because the commercial exemption applied.

Key Takeaways

Although priorities have clearly shifted, it would be a mistake to treat FARA enforcement as stalled. In light of the foregoing, those advancing the interests of foreign parties, especially foreign governments, should heed the following trends:

• Current and former government officials and contractors should take care in their interactions with foreign government personnel. Most recent criminal prosecutions involves access to non-public, government information and accommodation of foreign requests for information or advocacy.
• Although the Bondi Memo may signal an aversion to criminal prosecution in commercial contexts, the Bondi Memo does not limit civil investigations or enforcement, nor does it limit Congressional inquiries, which continue to invoke FARA. Because of the statute’s breadth, it’s an appealing tool to target US persons with ties to foreign persons and entities that are undesirable (in the eye of the beholder).
• Non-profits, NGOs, think tanks, academic institutions, and others that do not engage in for-profit, commercial activities, and which have foreign ties (including, but not limited to, foreign funding) should be mindful of NSPM-7 and the potential to invoke FARA as a basis to investigate those foreign ties for an undisclosed agency relationship.
• Those same entities—any organization that is not a “corporation” or lacks a clear profit motive—will struggle to qualify for the commercial exemption under § 613(d) unless they can demonstrate that their activities further operations and interests in the United States (as distinct from benefit to a foreign organization).
• At the same time, activity that directly benefits a foreign government, even if only financially, as part of a commercial transaction, may not qualify for the commercial exemption in the eyes of the FARA Unit, which has signaled increased attention to whether even for-profit corporations are state-owned.
• On the other hand, especially in cases involving engagement with the US government or direct benefit to a foreign government, working through counsel in established channels may provide a clearer path that is exempt from registration.

Despite the shifts in criminal priorities and resources, consulting with counsel and memorializing the basis for any decision not to register remains a critical step in demonstrating good faith and managing legal risk, should DOJ later disagree with that decision.

Finally, separate and apart from FARA, those engaged at the state and local levels should take note of so-called Baby FARA laws recently implemented in Texas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. They typically (but not always) target activities on behalf of “countries of concern” (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela) or entities within their jurisdiction and differ from each other (and FARA) in their requirements and prohibitions.

¹In addition, two defendants, Michael McMahon (who was convicted of acting as an unregistered foreign agent under 18 U.S.C. § 951) and Imaad Zuberi (who was convicted of FARA and campaign violations), received executive clemency. Because the rationale for those actions by the President are not public, we can only speculate about it.

Table 1: Snapshot of Temporarily Available 2024–25 Advisory Opinions