



Summary judgment in the context of insolvency set-off

Summary

On 14 May 2007 the High Court¹ gave judgment on an appeal against summary judgment in favour of claimants, Swissport (UK) Limited (in liquidation) ("**Swissport**"), against Aer Lingus Limited ("**Aer Lingus**"). This judgment contains useful comments on the Court's approach to summary judgment in the context of claimant insolvency. It also emphasises, in relation to insolvency set-off, the requirement on the "decision-maker" to estimate any cross-claim, rather than simply taking it at face value.

Factual background

Swissport's claim against Aer Lingus

This decision arises out of the provision by Swissport of ground handling services to Aer Lingus at Heathrow airport (the "**Services**").

The Court at first instance² gave summary judgment in favour of Swissport against Aer Lingus for unpaid charges for the Services rendered before the administration of Swissport (the "**Unpaid Charges**"). On appeal Aer Lingus did not dispute the amount of the Unpaid Charges but contended that summary judgment was not appropriate as it had a cross-claim whose value exceeded that of the Unpaid Charges.

Historically Aer Lingus had employed its own staff to provide ground handling services for its flights into and out of Heathrow airport. However, in 1999 Aer Lingus transferred this business to Swissport and the latter contracted to provide the Services to it. This contract was to be in force until 2009. On 16 November 2004 Swissport ceased to provide the Services and later that day went into administration. Subsequently it went into liquidation.

1 *Swissport (UK) Limited (in liquidation) v Aer Lingus Limited* [2007] EWHC 1089 (Mr Peter Prescott QC (sitting Deputy Judge of the High Court of Justice)).

2 Deputy Master Hoffman, 15 September 2006 (prior to the liquidation of Swissport).

Aer Lingus' contingent cross-claim

As a result of the collapse of its business at Heathrow, Swissport dismissed a number of employees, some of whom found jobs with Aer Lingus or with the outside contractors providing ground handling services to Aer Lingus (in place of Swissport). Many of those employees brought claims relating to the termination of their employment not only against Swissport but also against Aer Lingus. They did so claiming that, prior to 16 November 2004, there had existed an “undertaking” within the meaning of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (“**TUPE**”) which was in the hands of Swissport and which undertaking (or part thereof) was transferred to Aer Lingus.

The employment claims (or a segment of those claims) came before the Employment Tribunal which ruled that such an “undertaking” did not exist and that therefore there was no transfer of undertaking to which TUPE applied. An appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“**EAT**”) was brought but, as at the date of the judgment in this case, that decision had not been delivered.

It was Aer Lingus' position that the EAT might allow the appeal in which case the employment claims would be allowed to proceed and this, in turn, could result in successful claims against it. Aer Lingus argued that, pursuant to a clause in the 1999 business transfer agreement between it and Swissport, the latter was required to indemnify it in respect of any successful employee claims or, alternatively, that Swissport's failure to provide the Services on and after 16 November 2004 was a breach of contract for which Aer Lingus was entitled to claim damages including any loss which it would sustain if the employee claims were successful.

However, the Court was concerned that the cross-claim upon which Aer Lingus sought to rely was dependent upon an “*accumulation of contingencies*”, for instance, not only would the EAT have to reverse the decision currently before it but the tribunal would have to be satisfied that the employees lost their jobs as a result of that transfer and not because of Swissport's insolvency. Ultimately, it was the Court's view that it was “pretty unlikely” that all of the contingencies required to establish the cross-claim would be established in the end.

Summary judgment in the context of insolvency

Civil Procedure Rules, Rule 24.2 states that the Court may give summary judgment if it considers that the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim and that there is no other compelling reason why the case should be disposed of at trial. “May” imports a discretion and the Court noted that it must exercise this discretion in order to promote the overriding objective to do justice between the parties. Such exercise must depend on the circumstances of each particular case.

The Court made two general statements in relation to summary judgment in the context of insolvency. If the claimant is insolvent then summary judgment in his favour may produce unjust consequences as the defendant may never recover in full any cross-claim which he later successfully prosecutes. However, a rule that the Court would never give summary judgment in favour of an insolvent claimant whenever the defendant might have a good cross-claim would also result in unjust consequences and was therefore inappropriate.

Insolvency set-off

The Court considered Insolvency Rules 1986, Rule 4.90 which provides, *inter alia*, that “an account shall be taken of what is due from each party to the other ...”.

Aer Lingus argued that, if its cross-claim (founded on contingent employment claims) has any real prospect of success, the Court had no option but to refuse summary judgment as, to the extent that set-off under Rule 4.90 operates, there was no debt due from it to Swissport.

However, the Court did not agree with this argument. It found that the “account” which is required to be taken properly involves the valuation of the cross-claim. The Court referred to the judgment of Lord Hoffmann in *Stein v Blake*³ (noting that similar principles would apply in relation to both personal and corporate insolvency) and concluded that a cross-claim does not have to be taken at face value, the “decision-maker” is entitled and required to estimate it and “if the cross-claim is, to say the least, shadowy ... nobody is forced to proceed on the basis of a fiction”.

The Court rejected the submission that, once a cross-claim is shown to be barely arguable, it must be estimated at face value and then set-off for summary judgment purposes against an undoubted claim on which summary judgment would otherwise be available.

The Court’s decision

As noted above it was the Court’s view that it was “*pretty unlikely*” that all of the contingencies required to establish Aer Lingus’ cross-claim would be established in the end. Accordingly, the Court held the cross-claim in “low esteem” and concluded that it constituted neither a discretionary bar to summary judgment under Rule 24.2 nor a set-off under Rule 4.90.

Summary judgment in favour of Swissport was therefore upheld but, as it appeared to the Court that the decision of the EAT on the employee claims would be available very soon, the Court ordered that the Liquidators of Swissport undertake to it not to distribute the summary judgment monies to creditors until 14 days after the EAT delivers its judgment. The purpose of this undertaking was to afford Aer Lingus the opportunity to make such application to the Court as it may be advised.

Conclusion

In relation to summary judgment the Court declined to set down any hard-and-fast rules as to the approach which should be taken to a summary judgment application by an insolvent claimant, each decision will depend on the facts of the particular case.

In the context of insolvency set-off the Court emphasised that it is not the case that any “barely arguable” cross-claim can form the subject matter of a set-off, all cross-claims must be “estimated” (a process which, in this case, included consideration of the likelihood that the contingencies to which a cross-claim was subject would be satisfied).

If you would like any further information about this please speak to your usual contact in the **Financial Restructuring & Insolvency Group**

3 [1996] AC 243.

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