MAYER BROWN

New York Issues Whistleblower Guidance to All DFS-Regulated Institutions

Consumer Finance Monthly Breakfast Briefing



Krista Cooley Partner +1 202 263 3315 kcooley@mayerbrown.com Stephanie C. Robinson *Partner* +1 202 263 3353 srobinson@mayerbrown.com March 20, 2019

DFS Guidance



- New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) issues guidance on January 7, 2019
- Applies to all entities chartered, licensed, or regulated by the DFS
- Enunciates principles that all regulated institutions should account for when designing and implementing a whistleblowing program



What Is Whistleblowing?

- Report of information or concern by virtually anyone
- May involve reasonable belief of:
 - Illegality
 - Fraud
 - Unfair or unethical conduct
 - Mismanagement
 - Abuse of power
 - Unsafe or dangerous activity
 - Other wrongful conduct (may affect reputation or safety and soundness)



Elements of An Effective Program

- 1. Clear and consistent reporting channels
- 2. Anonymity protections
- 3. Procedures for managing conflicts of interest
- 4. Adequately trained staff to handle the investigation
- 5. Established investigation procedures
- 6. Established follow-up procedures for valid complaints
- 7. Retaliation protections
- 8. Confidential treatment
- 9. Appropriate oversight
- 10. Top-down culture of support for whistleblowing program



Barclays Bank Consent Order

- December 18, 2018: DFS announces Consent Order with Barclays Bank
- Bank is fined \$15 million under New York banking law provisions for conducting business in an unsafe and unsound matter by failing to implement effective governance and controls around whistleblowing program
- Bank received two anonymous letters concerning the recruitment and hiring of a senior executive that the CEO had recruited
- CEO then personally directed the head of security to attempt to identify the author(s) of the anonymous letters

What the Bank Did Right

- Commissioned a broad, independent review of business practices & culture
- Adopted substantially thorough whistleblowing policies and procedures
- Implemented anonymous reporting channels via phone or email to internal or external service
- Implemented a program through which senior managers are placed in Group Compliance for a 3-month rotation
- Established a dedicated Investigations & Whistleblowing Team
- Annual employee training
- Created a "Whistleblowers' Champion" position to oversee the I&W Team
- Created a "Global Head of Whistleblowing" position
- Drafted an Anonymity Policy

MAYER BROWN



What Went Wrong

- Anonymous letter sent to several members of Board
 - Letter contains accusations about personal issues of a recently-hired bank executive
 - CEO is specifically criticized for his role in soliciting this executive to join the bank
 - CEO believed the bulk of the allegations to be false, but understood that certain accusations were accurate
- Letter should have been forwarded directly to I&W Team but was not immediately recognized as a whistleblower complaint and instead was circulated among senior execs
 - CEO expresses desire to know who wrote the letter
- 2nd anonymous letter arrives three days later
- CEO contacts chief information security officer (CISO) and asks him to identify sender



What Went Wrong (cont.)

- CISO enlists a cybersecurity intelligence analyst who is temporarily assigned to an outside cybersecurity organization that included law enforcement agents
- The analyst asks contacts in US law enforcement agencies for assistance
- CISO learns from General Counsel and HR that the letters might be whistleblows, such that efforts to identify the author would be improper
- In a meeting among the executives, the GCCO and GC both firmly advise the CEO against trying to ID the author (discussion not memorialized)
- I&W concludes allegations were unsubstantiated; advises CEO of risks to bank that would flow from attempting to ID author (not documented)
- Three days later CEO resumes efforts to ID the letters' author
- He also texts a former colleague about it

DFS Findings

- Failure to follow or apply the whistleblowing policies and procedures in a manner that protected the bank and its CEO
- Incomplete positive cultural transformation
- CEO erred in seeking to identify the author(s) and by communicating about the matter outside of the bank
- As a principal witness, he had a conflict of interest
- He failed to consult directly with either the GCCO or GC before resuming his search for the author's identity
- His actions failed to serve the independence of the whistleblowing function



DFS Findings (cont.)

- Undermined the process and exposed the bank to additional risk by discussing the letters outside of the bank
- Other senior executives missed opportunities to intercede
- Despite generally suitable policies and procedures, there was a limited gap in guidance concerning identification and handling of whistleblower complaints that —
 - Both *involved* senior management and
 - Might also be *received* by senior management or the Board

Cooperation and Corrective Action Taken

- Acceptance of responsibility
- "Very substantial" cooperation with the DFS investigation
- To address the deficiencies in its whistleblowing program, the Bank:
 - Engaged an outside consultant to perform an independent review of whistleblowing policies, processes, and controls
 - Revised its procedures to recognize that concerns raised outside certain whistleblowing channels may nevertheless constitute whistleblows
 - Established procedures to avoid escalating a whistleblow to the subject of the concern
 - Instituted controls to preserve whistleblower anonymity

What Does the DFS Guidance Mean for Non-Bank Institutions Regulated by DFS?

- No express legal requirement to establish a whistleblowing program
- Many institutions already have programs in place but they may merit reevaluation
- Remember no "one size fits all" approach
- Lessons learned from Barclays story

Questions?



Americas Asia Europe Middle East

Mayer Brown is a global services provider comprising associated legal practices that are separate entities, including Mayer Brown LLP (Illinois, USA), Mayer Brown International LLP (England), Mayer Brown (a Hong Kong partnership) and Tauil & Chequer Advogados (a Brazilian law partnership) (collectively the "Mayer Brown Practices") and non-legal service providers, which provide consultancy services (the "Mayer Brown Practices and Mayer Brown Consultancies are established in various jurisdictions and may be a legal person or a partnership. Details of the individual Mayer Brown Practices and Mayer Brown Consultancies are established in various jurisdictions and may be a legal person or a partnership. Details of the individual Mayer Brown Practices and Mayer Brown. © Mayer Brown. © Mayer Brown. All rights reserved.