

Welcome

November 2013

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Agenda



- I. Welcome and Program Overview
- II. Perspectives on the Loan Market
- III. Regulatory, Accounting and Tax Issues: What Investors Need to Know
- IV. Structuring Portfolio Sales Recent International Experiences and Perspectives
- V. Q&A
- VI. Closing Remarks



II. Perspectives on the Loan Market

II. Perspectives on the Loan Market



Speakers

- Ted Basta, SVP Market Data & Analysis, LSTA
- Christopher Seyfarth, Partner, Transactional Advisory Services/Transaction Real Estate, Ernst & Young LLP
- Saul Burian, Managing Director, Financial Restructuring Group, Houlihan Lokey

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
The Corporate Loan Market






While Lending Activity Fell in 3Q13, New Money Loans Outpaced Refinancing Activity





It Has Taken Five Years For The S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index to Return to Its Pre-Crisis Size


~Outstandings Has Hit a Record \$645B - An Increase of \$100B in 2013









Share of Non-Bank Institutional Lending




Following a 30-Year Period of Declining Treasury Rates, The Street is Projecting a Considerable Move Higher




While Loan Retail Funds Have Taken in \$53B This Year, HY Bond Flows Have Run Negative at -\$8B





2013 CLO Issuance (\$59B) & Retail Fund Flows (\$53B) Totaled \$112B Through 3Q13






Loans Traded Higher Through Mid-May on Strong Technicals (The Supply & Demand Equation)






Both The Mean and Median Trade Price Has Remained Range-bound in 3Q13 at 98 and 100.125, Respectively



Annualized 2013 Trading Volume Represents a Record High of \$521B While The Annual Turn-Over Ratio on The S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index (LLI) Has Peaked at 70%




3Q13 Trade Volumes Fell 19% to \$121B as More Than 80% of Total Activity Occurred at Prices Above 98



TOTAL -PAR -DIS \$175 \$150 \$125 Billions \$100 \$75 \$50 \$25 4Q12

% of Trade Volume by Price Range




Source: LSTA Trade Data Study


Monthly Market Breadth and Depth Analysis Supports a Robust Secondary Trading Market



Monthly Market Breadth



• Monthly Market Depth



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An Update on the Non-Performing Loan Report



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
A Broader View of the Secondary Markets





Secondary Market Development Milestones






Secondary Market Framework




Limited liquidity and low volumes characterize assets that are "traded" in the secondary market




Commonly Traded Illiquid Assets






Secondary Market Buyers





Diverse capital pools with the capacity to directly or indirectly invest in illiquid assets

Convergence of Secondary Markets and Buyers





III. Regulatory, Accounting and Tax Issues: What Investors Need to Know

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Speakers

- Tess C. Virmani, Assistant General Counsel, LSTA
- Jason Bazar, Partner, Mayer Brown
- Donald Waack, Associate, Mayer Brown
- Christopher Seyfarth, Partner, Transactional Advisory Services/Transaction Real Estate, Ernst & Young LLP

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LSTA's View on Regulatory Challenges





How are FATCA and the Volcker Rule Impacting the Market So Far?



FASB and GAAP – New Rules: New Interpretations?





IV. Structuring Portfolio Sales –Recent InternationalExperiences and Perspectives

IV. Structuring Portfolio Sales –Recent International Experiences and Perspectives



Speakers

- Jayne Backett, Associate, Mayer Brown
- Paul A. Jorissen, Partner, Mayer Brown
- Jon Van Gorp, Partner, Mayer Brown
- Saul Burian, Managing Director, Financial Restructuring Group, Houlihan Lokey
- Jörg Wulfken, Partner, Mayer Brown
- Jamie Pereda, Partner, Uria Menendez

Process Design and Other Considerations in Structuring and Timing Sales HOULIHAN LOKEY



Portfolio vs. Single Asset Sale



- Sellers are often tempted to pursue single asset sales, believing this approach would maximize sales proceeds, but experience shows this scenario frequently does not optimize pricing or fully achieve transaction objectives
 - A seller approaching the market in a serial, single asset sale fashion is typically left with a lower quality stub portfolio for which the market severely discounts
 - The end result is that aggregate proceeds from a one-off liquidation approach typically falls below the original projected recovery amount
 - On the other hand, a single coordinated portfolio sales effort even if it results in transactions with several different counterparties – frequently yields higher total proceeds than the serial sale approach due to the leverage the process creates for the seller over the interested buyer groups
 - Buyers tend to spread exposure to high risk credits across a portfolio, allowing them to aggressively price more predictable credits
 - Whole-portfolio sales through an auction process introduces pricing tension; in particular when full transparency creates an equal playing field for all potential investors
 - Single name sales can be more suitable when a portfolio has:
 - Liquid names for which pricing discovery is of little value
 - Very large controlling exposures for a dedicated loan-to-own investor





Houlihan Lokey has represented numerous financial institutions in the disposition of illiquid asset portfolios, having gained significant, real-world insight into transaction dynamics and buyer behavior

Potential Challenges	Mitigating Factors	
Portfolio positioning requires sound knowledge of buyer mandates and market trends	Given our experience in recent portfolio transactions, we understand each investor's specific mandate, and we can quickly recognize which opportunities allow investors to relax or stretch their traditional parameters	
Properly prepared portfolios achieve superior results	 It is essential to conduct significant pre-marketing credit and portfolio analysis We have demonstrated how an effective intermediary can bring organization and clarity to transform a previously undifferentiated collection of assets into a "portfolio" with an articulated return profile 	
Portfolio segmentation should be used to drive investor targeting	 Understanding the identifiable characteristics and unique groupings of a portfolio substantially influences a successful loan sale outcome Buyers generally identify with investments they favor 	
Illiquid credits present greatest pricing uncertainty	The market for performing credits is relatively efficient, but the market for illiquid credits is by definition not nearly as efficient – it is important to understand the portfolio's value drivers on a credit-by-credit basis or representative sample basis (for very granular portfolios)	
Transparency levels the playing field	The goal of any upfront diligence / analysis should be to empower bidders without special knowledge of a particular credit or sector to bid as confidently as a bidder who believes they have an "inside angle"	
Buyer behavior can be heavily influenced by fund life cycle and investment philosophy	A bidder's behavior can change from process to process depending upon life cycle and investment philosophy considerations, so we devote considerable resources to tracking ongoing developments at funds and their sponsors	
Line-item pricing is a critical tool to optimizing proceeds	Bidders often oppose providing any level of sub-portfolio pricing granularity for fear of being "cherry picked" but we are familiar with the usual objections and are adept at giving participants a high degree of comfort in the procedural integrity of our processes	

Portfolio Segmentation Considerations



Portfolio segmentation is more than identifying common characteristics across credits – it is about monetizing investors' willingness and ability to pay up for portfolios that match their investment philosophy and guidelines

Key Portfolio Segmentation Considerations			
Size	 Portfolios with critical mass tend to be well received by the market Large portfolios tend to attract parties most willing to price competitively, including strategic acquirers of discrete assets and investment managers interested in gathering large pools of assets 		
Performing / Non- Performing Credits	 Mix of performing / non-performing credits allows portfolio buyers to spread high risk credit exposure across entire portfolio Appeals to segment buyers with diverse return expectations 		
Distressed "Status"	 Some buyers tend to be more attracted to "liquidation" situations vs. "recovery plays." The more advanced the legal status, the more comfortable investors are to bid up for distressed credits It is important to understand expected recovery, time to recovery, collateral value, downside protection and level of visibility in restructuring path(s) 		
Control Positions	 Most loan-to-own investors attach investment premium for control exposures on the distressed front Emphasis on quality of management, turnaround strategy and industrial value proposition 		
Sponsor-Led Leveraged Loans	Behavioral motivation of sponsors critical in assessing creditworthiness, financial risk appetite and recovery		
Industry Exposure	Most performing and non-performing corporate credit buyers are agnostic in terms of industry exposures Some buyers may have unique expertise and will be keen to acquire a single name with a potential loan –to -own approach OR take strategic industry approach to a loan book within an industry segment		
Geographical Exposure	■ Investors tolerate modest sovereign, economic and liquidity risks to justify opportunistic pricing		

Pricing Methodology



Several methodologies and factors are used by the buyer universe when evaluating loan portfolios

Pricing Methodologies			
Methodology / Factor	Application		
Recovery Analysis / Collateral Value	■ Determine the "watermark" for what might become the fulcrum security in distressed and pre-distressed situations with unclear paths to restructuring		
	Understand collateral value as an enhancement for stressed and performing credits		
Secondary Market Pricing	Review publicly available information to ascertain liquidity levels and market color		
	■ Scrutinize reliability of available bids and trades		
Treeng	■ Cross-reference with fundamental valuation of underlying assets		
Comparable Market	■ Conduct relative pricing analysis of relevant comparable issuances and loan indices		
Pricing	■ Cross-reference results with other analytical approaches		
Sovereign Risk	■ Analyze sovereign premium through comparable analysis across jurisdictions		
	■ Sovereign risk premium diluted because of strong seniority, over-collateralization and resilient cash flow generation		
Liquidity Risk	■ Low or no liquidity risk premium because vast majority of investors assumed to be "hold to maturity" or "loan to own"		
Bankruptcy Framework	Examine underlying bankruptcy framework for creditor-friendless legal regimes and determine premium		
Ch 1:4 Ct	 Assess extent to which prior restructuring or credit breach impacts current pricing 		
Credit Stigma	■ Weigh credit stigma effect and assign premium		
Undrawn Commitments	■ Apply "net back [†] " approach to undrawn commitments unless obligation to fund released by event of default		

[†]"Net back" equals (price to par multiplied by drawn amount) minus ((one minus price to par) multiplied by undrawn amount)





There are advantages and disadvantages to each alternative and it is imperative to match the transaction objectives and the portfolio characteristics with the best approach

Туре	Pros	Cons
Single Sale of Whole Portfolio	 Would capitalize on strong desire/need of some investors to execute large investments quickly Could achieve more aggressive pricing if competitive tension takes hold Would be streamlined process relative to other options 	 Could result in diminished prices for higher quality loans Could require external financing or investor syndicate due to size
Simultaneous Sale of Sub- Portfolios	 Would expand the pool of potential investors by allowing investors to bid more confidently based on what they know and not bid defensively based on what they do not know Would tap into "natural buyers" for distinct asset types and play better to investor "target ranges" Could reduce potential discounts seen on larger, undifferentiated loan sale portfolios 	 Would increase process complexity as a result of multiple parties (e.g. diligence, negotiations) Would create more complicated and time-intensive closing mechanics (relative to Single Portfolio Sale)
Sequenced Sale of Sub-Portfolios	 Would enable you to time market appetite for specific asset types as global economy shifts Would tap into natural buyers for distinct asset types and investment sizes Would enable you to establish credibility for sales effort and to generate increasing investor interest over time 	 Would increase the time required of internal resources Would increase risk of being left with non-salable "stub" portfolio Would slow return of capital Would increase complexity of exit from portfolio positions
Work-outs with Opportunistic Sales	 Could result in higher gross proceeds over longer period of time Would allow creation of customized solutions for individual assets and borrowers 	 Would be a significant drain on internal resources Would subject you to continued market risk (i.e. further deterioration of portfolio) Would delay return and re-deployment of capital Could leave an unsalable stub-portfolio

Investor Segments



The buyer segments are diverse and each carries different investment parameters and decision drivers; it is critical to understand the investment parameters for the largest and most active illiquid credit buyers globally

Buyer Type	Observations		
Special Situation Hedge Funds	 Sophisticated investors with broad mandates Ability to commit large pools of capital to illiquid situations Active, opportunistic investors seeking deep value or distressed situations 		
Credit Hedge Funds	 Highly skilled fixed income investors that understand credit stories One of most prevalent hedge fund strategies making this a fertile buyer segment Eager to increase European exposure Sitting on large pools of capital and able to quickly mobilize resources 		
Financial Institutions	 Select group of banks, insurance companies and specialty finance companies have an appetite and an ability to invest in large, illiquid credit markets at tight pricing levels May present a strategic acquisition opportunity, particularly if relationships or exposures overlap Direct alternative lenders actively participate in the secondary market for loans and sometime co-bid with hedge fund 		
Dedicated Secondary Private Equity Funds	 Sophisticated investment teams and reservoirs of untapped capital Largest secondary funds becoming comfortable investing in illiquid credit portfolios Frequently back teams with credit skills or specific asset knowledge to augment their own capabilities or servicing needs 		
Institutional Investors and Sovereign Wealth Funds	 Large pools of capital (e.g., pension funds, endowments, foundations) are traditional backers of dedicated secondary funds and frequent syndicate members in large co-investments Select few recently developed in-house investment capabilities with the specific mandate to manage assets directly 		
Listed Alternative Investment Vehicles	 U.S. BDC's and European investment trusts with a focus on illiquid credits are active in the secondary loan market Vehicles target yield-based investors Some are subject to large inflows of capital and can bid aggressively on large, broadly diversified loan portfolios 		

Sales Process and Time Frame



A four stage targeted auction process for portfolio sales is, in most cases, the most effective way to monetize a portfolio of illiquid credit assets

- A small group of highly qualified buyers are selected, vetted and engaged
- Allows highly sensitive information to be delivered only to the most serious buyers with a distinct competence and/or known "edge" in specific sectors
- Introduces potential to improve pricing through competitive tension a powerful counterweight to buyers' tendency to price opportunistically when they "smell a deal"

Gradual culling of investors in a staged, targeted auction allows a meaningful number of buyers to enter the process but enables resources to be increasingly focused on the likeliest buyers

II. Marketing and IV. Closing(s) and III. Documentation I. Pre-Marketing Diligence and Execution **Transfer Process** ■ Negotiate individual ■ Finalize portfolio analysis, ■ Monitor progress of data ■ Choose winning bid(s) transfer agreements segmentation room entrants ■ Facilitate legal and ■ Develop "Teaser" and ■ Reconcile closing payments Respond to diligence confirmatory diligence with cash flows marketing materials requests ■ Negotiate purchase ■ Coordinate rolling closes ■ Prepare data room ■ Review and clarify initial documents indications: narrow field of with winning bidder ■ Initiate review of transfer ■ Execute purchase potential bidders restrictions and jurisdictional documents analysis ■ Distribute additional disclosure materials and ■ Finalize target investor list arrange follow-up diligence ■ Negotiate form ■ Distribute transaction confidentiality agreement documents ("CA") ■ Final bids submitted. ■ Manage CA process and clarified and evaluated distribute disclosure and marketing materials 2+ Weeks 3-5 Weeks 3-5 Weeks 3-5 Weeks





It is possible to bridge seller-buyer perceptions of current value through structuring techniques

Technique	Attributes		
Deferred Payments	 Schedule of purchase consideration payments established for 2-3 year period Buyer rate of return increases enabling buyer to pay higher "announced" price Could narrow pricing gap by 10-15% Some buyers will have to reserve equity, carrying hidden cost to them 		
Seller Financing	 Formal term loan extended to buyer on favorable terms Expands potential pool of buyers and enables buyers to bid more aggressively Narrows pricing gap (but not by as much as deferred payments) Buyers will assign higher risk to loan than to deferred payments 		
Third-Party Debt	 Senior, non-recourse financing used to fund up to 50% of portfolio purchase price Allows purchasers to bid more aggressively but risk profile and return expectations increase Limited availability and higher cost since onset of financial crisis 		
New Vehicle with Negotiated Terms	 Use of waterfalls to divide up cash flows on a contractual, negotiated basis Can overcome pricing gaps and may be able to remedy certain accounting issues Must be careful to determine if accounting and sale objectives can be achieved 		
Regulatory Capital Relief	 Banks have the ability to offer a static pool of illiquid assets as a reference collateral base (fully crystallizing the investment proposition) and raise "capital-friendly" money in the private markets Regulators are increasingly perceiving these transactions as a means to raising true alternative equity 		
Sophisticated buyers willing to work with motivated sellers to achieve objectives			

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Risk Retention and Risk Avoidance Structures



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Servicing Issues





International Transactional Experiences — Making the Deal Happen

International Transactional Experiences — Making the Deal Happen



- Germany
- United Kingdom
- Spain
- Ireland, US and Puerto Rico

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International Transactional Experiences — Making the Deal Happen



International Transactional Experiences Making the Deal Happen



- 1) The German Loan Portfolio Market
- 2) Transaction Structures
- 3) Legal Issues
 - Banking Secrecy / Data Protection
 - Banking License
 - Refinancing Register
 - Others
- 4) Tax Issues
- 5) German Loan Portfolio Team

The German Loan Portfolio Market



- From 2003 to 2007 Germany had the most active "NPL market" with more than €50bn trade volume
 - Mayer Brown has advised either the buyer or the seller on most of the recently closed transactions
- Asset classes
 - NPL, subperforming, performing loans, mixed portfolios
 - Mortgage loans (85%), corporate loans (2%), other/no information (13%)
 - Structured finance positions (CDOs, CCOs et al.)
- Germany has developed a highly competitive servicer industry

Transaction Structures



- Asset deals
 - Assignment
 - Assumption of Contract
- Share deals
 - Transformation Act (universal succession)
 - Joint ventures
 - Combined asset/share deals
- Synthetic transfers
 - Subparticipation
 - Guarantees
 - CDS et al

Legal Issues - Banking Secrecy / Data Protection

- Banks have a general duty (general law principle; stipulated in General Business Conditions)
- Data Protection applies to private individuals
- Banking Secrecy Rules / Data Protection Laws require a reconciliation of interests (Interessenabwägung)
- NPLs: a bank is generally entitled to transfer necessary data

Legal Issues — Banking Secrecy / Data Protection

- Performing Loans
 - Transfer of data to third parties in principle is prohibited.
 Acquisition does not justify disclosure
 - Consequences:
 - BaFin Circular 4/97
 - seller acts as service agent
 - data trustee
 - encryption of data
 - Due Diligence: access to credit files limited to advisors who are subject to professional confidentiality liability (e.g. auditors, lawyers)
 - reporting to investor only in anonymous form

Legal Issues — Banking Secrecy / Data Protection

- Disclosure permissible:
 - Borrower consent
 - Compliance with regulatory disclosure duties (possible through trustee model or transfer of data to compliance division of purchaser)
 - Universal succession through spin-off (*Abspaltung*) or hive-down (*Ausgliederung*); majority opinion:
 - no disclosure to third party as NewCo is legal successor
- Section 203 German Criminal Code
 - applies to saving banks and Landesbanken (under discussion)
 - applies to insurance companies (§ 203 para. 1 no. 6)
 - scope in insurance related information
 - does not apply to private banks
 - reconciliation of interests / principle of equal treatment

Legal Issues — Banking License



- Purchase of loans is not "lending business"
 (§ 1 para 1 no. 2 German Banking Act (KWG))
- Exceptions
 - rescheduling by way of novation
 - prolongation of loan terms
 - interest rate adjustment (debatable)
 - purchase of undrawn credit lines (guarantees and current accounts)

Legal Issues — Banking License



- Purchase of loan receivables qualifies as financial enterprise
 - (§ 1 para. 3 no. 2 German Banking Act.)
 - banking or other licence under German Banking Act not required
 - consolidation for regulatory capital calculations
 - reporting requirements (§ 14 German Banking Act)
 - consolidation for large exposure limits

Legal Issues — Refinancing Register



- Aim of refinance register (Refinanzierungsregister)
 - facilitating mortgage-backed securitisations
 - insolvency-remote and cost efficient "transfer" of receivables and certain collateral
- Administration of register
 - regulated credit institutions, insurance companies, pension funds, the German Federal Bank, KfW and certain federal governmental agencies in respect of their own assets and/or assets of third parties
- Eligible for registration
 - receivables, land charges, mortgages and other registered liens

Legal Issues — Refinancing Register



- Beneficiary is entitled to segregation (*Aussonderung*) in insolvency of originator or refinancing intermediary
 - Registration supersedes transfer restrictions
- Supervision of administration
 - BaFin appoints administrator (Verwalter)

Legal Issues — Others



- Portfolio transactions could lead to automatic transfer of employees (Sec. 613a German Civil Code)
- Portfolio transaction might be subject to merger notification filings either with
 - German Cartel Office <u>or</u>
 - European Union Commission
 - subject to thresholds

Tax Issues



- Sales of acquisition loans, corporate loans and customer cash accounts are VAT-exempt transactions
- In the VAT regulations, the German tax authorities are still taking the view that the sale of a loan portfolio can imply VATable factoring services provided by the buyer to the seller
- However, the German Fiscal Court (July 4th, 2013 (V R 8/10)) has held that the acquistion of a loan does not constitute factoring as long as the purchase price reflects the economic value of the loan

Tax Issues



- It is unclear whether the German Fiscal Court will adopt the ruling and incorporate them into the VAT regulations
- There will be no issue regarding factoring if all three elements of the acquisition form a business as a whole (*Geschäftsver-äußerung als Ganzes*) pursuant to Sec. 1 para 1A VAT Act

German Loan Portfolio Team: Partners





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International Transactional Experiences — Making the Deal Happen



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Financial Assistance from the Eurogroup




Based on OW stress tests results, Spanish banks were classified in four groups:



Ownership and Financial Structure of SAREB



• Shareholders:



^{*} Others: Bankinter, Unicaja, Cajamar, Caja Laboral, Banca March, Cecabank, Banco Cooperativo Español, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Mapfre, Mutua Madrileña, Catalana Occidente, Axa, Iberdrola and Banco Caminos.

Transfer Price



Haircut (average) over Gross Asset Value:

Type of asset	Haircut (average)	Type of asset	Haircut (average)
LOANS:	45.6%	FORECLOSED ASSETS	63.1%
Finished housing	32.4%	Finished housing	54.2%
Development in progress	40.3%	Development in progress	63.2%
Urban land	53.6%	Land	79.5%
Others with in rem guarantee	33.8%		
Others without in rem guarantee	67.6%		

Banking Assets Funds (FABs)



	FAB	SL/SA	
CIT taxation?	1%	30%	
Any tax on real estate/mortgage loans acquired from SAREB?	No transfer tax No stamp tax 21%-10%-0% VAT	3%-10% transfer tax 0.5%- 2% stamp duty 21%-10%-0% VAT	
Municipal transfer tax (IIVTNU)?	Yes (unless the acquirer is a FAB)	Yes	
Real estate tax (IBI)?	Yes	Yes	
Dividend taxation for NR participants?	No	Yes (unless tax treaty)	
Capital gains taxation for NR participants?	No	Yes (unless tax treaty or listing)	

International Transactional Experiences — Making the Deal Happen



QUESTIONS?



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